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Abstract—ETSI ITS-G5 is the current vehicle-to-vehicle com-
munication technology in Europe, which will be standardized
by ETSI TC ITS1. It is based on IEEE 802.11p and therefore
uses a CSMA/CA scheme for Media Access Control (MAC). In
this paper we analyze the performance of Cooperative Awareness
Message (CAM) based safety applications using the ETSI ITS-G5
MAC technology in a challenging scenario with respect to MAC
issues: A suitable freeway segment with 6 lanes in each direction.
The freeway scenario is thoroughly modeled and implemented in
the well known ns-3 simulation environment. Based on this model,
the paper shows the performance of CAM based safety appli-
cations under MAC challenging conditions. We provide a set of
simulation results resting upon a particular performance metric
which incorporates the key requirements of safety applications.
Finally we analyze two concrete example scenarios to determine
how reliable CAM based safety applications are in high dense
traffic scenarios with respect to MAC issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
After the huge success of passive safety systems and similar
success indicators seen with recent advanced driver assistance
systems towards a “zero accidents“ vision in future Intelli-
gent Transport Systems (ITS), the next big potential is seen
in cooperating systems [28]. For this to become reality, a
robust and reliable vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-roadside
communication is a necessary prerequisite as an enabling
technology. ETSI TC ITS is paving the way towards this by
standardizing ETSI ITS-G5 [1], a Vehicular Ad-hoc NETwork
(VANET) communication standard based on IEEE 802.11p
[3].
ETSI ITS-G5 mainly describes the physical (PHY) and
medium access control (MAC) sublayer of ITS stations oper-
ating in the 5.9 GHz frequency band. It covers the frequency
ranges G5A, G5B and G5C, of which G5A is dedicated
for safety and safety related applications. Other applications
have to use the G5B or G5C frequency bands. Since our
interests lie more in the area of safety applications, this paper
is focusing on ITS-G5A. The PHY layer of G5A defines
three 10 MHz channels, one control channel (CCH) and two
service channels (SCH1 and SCH2), which allow vehicles to
send with a transmit power of up to 33 dBm.The modulation
scheme which is used for ITS-G5A is Orthogonal Frequency
1European Telecommunications Standards Institute Technical Committee
for Intelligent Transportation Systems.
Division Multiplexing (OFDM). This technique provides data
rates from 3 MBit/s up to 27 MBit/s per channel.
The MAC layer of ITS-G5A uses a Carrier Sense Multiple
Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) scheme to
access the shared media. CSMA/CA is known to perform well
in non-congested networks, but degrades dramatically with a
strong increase in network load [18]. One reason for this is
that the collision avoidance mechanism of CSMA/CA relies
on acknowledgement messages which do not make sense for
broadcasted messages such as the CAM beaconing messages.
Likewise, there is no RTS/CTS mechanism available to avoid
the hidden terminal problem in VANETs, but on the other hand
the exposed terminal problem does not exist.
Using this communication technology, vehicles can inform
each other about their current status and certain events, pro-
viding the necessary means to establish a cooperative situation
awareness. Safety applications, which are in the focus of
our work, can process the received information either to
warn the driver about some upcoming dangerous situation, up
to eventually automatically control the vehicle to avoid the
situation entirely or at least to significantly decrease its effect.
Currently, the following two message types are being stan-
dardized [6], [7]:
• Cooperative Awareness Message (CAM): This message
is used to inform the other vehicles about the current
status of the sending vehicle, such as the current geo-
graphical position, speed and heading. CAMs are typi-
cally broadcasted as periodical beacons with a frequency
of 1-10 Hz.
• Decentralized Environment Notification Message
(DENM): This message is used to inform the vehicles
in a certain area close to an event about a special event
such as roadwork construction or an accident.
Because most of the safety applications in [5] are based on
periodic status messages, we will focus our analysis on CAM
based safety applications, such as lane change assistance or
Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC). To analyze the
performance of this kind of applications, we introduced in [8]
the so called update delay metric, which is a special receiver
based performance metric for periodic information distribu-
tion. The update delay plotted as Complementary Cumulative
Distribution Function (CCDF) has exposed to be an important
performance indicator to determine the reliability of the MAC
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communication and by association of the safety application
itself.
In this paper we want to present two contributions according
to the performance analysis of CAM based safety applications
using ITS-G5A MAC:
• By means of simulations, we provide a comprehensive
set of update delay CCDFs, which serves as a base for
our following safety application evaluation.
• We evaluate two CAM based example safety applications,
which shows their performance and reliability by using
ITS-G5A MAC in high dense scenarios.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses some relevant related work. The simulation
scenario is summarized in section III. The results of the
simulations are shown in section IV. Finally section V analyses
the reliability of current ITS-G5A MAC by means of two
example applications.
II. RELATED WORK
Several papers have been published, which analyze the
performance of VANETs. Most of them use throughput, la-
tency and reception or collision probability as performance
metrics. For instance, Eichler evaluated the performance of
IEEE 802.11p WAVE in [9], including the influence of the
different access classes. He used the average packet through-
put, the collision probability and the end-to-end delay to mea-
sure the performance. In [18] Brakemeier analyzed VANETs
analytically by treating them as a stochastic process with
Poisson distributed message arrivals. He calculated the average
packet delay and the packet loss probability for evaluation
purposes. The packet reception probability was analyzed in
[14]. In doing so, the authors concentrated on the distance
based interference effect, if an emergency vehicle approaches
a traffic jam. Bilstrub simulated the performance of 802.11p
MAC in [11] to compare it with their proposed STDMA
approach. They measured the distributions of the channel
access delay, of the distance within nodes which are sending at
the same time and of the number of consecutive packet drops.
A similar study was published by Cozzetti et al. in [12]. They
also compared 802.11p with an own MAC scheme called RR-
Aloha+ and it’s improved version MS-Aloha. For comparison
they used mainly the well known latency metric and the packet
delivery ratio (PDR) which is an equivalent to the packet
reception probability. In [10] Yin et al. did some simulations
of a city scenario. To analyze the performance, they used the
packet latency and throughput as metrics. In [15] the authors
chose among others the probability of successful reception, the
channel busy time and the channel access time to evaluate the
VANET communication. A real world experiment with a fleet
of three vehicles was done in [17]. There the packet delivery
ratio and the distribution of consecutive packet drops were
used as performance metric. They also characterized a kind of
application-level reliability, which might be the most important
information for safety application designers. In [13] ElBatt et
al. simulated a freeway scenario and used the packet inter-
reception time, the cumulative number of packet receptions,
the packet success probability and the per-packet latency to
do a performance evaluation. The packet inter-reception time
basically conforms the update delay metric in [8], but the
authors of [13] only presented this metric over simulation time
and did no statistical preprocessing for a more precise analysis.
In contrast Kloiber et al. [8] concentrated on this metric and
worked out it’s importance especially for CAM based safety
applications, because it shows the correlation between the
update delay and the up-to-dateness of the knowledge about
the status of vehicles in the surrounding. Furthermore they
showed a detailed statistical analysis, including a suitable rep-
resentation of this metric, which is very significant to evaluate
the MAC performance with respect to key requirements for
safety applications.
Unsurprisingly, the performance results of all these papers
differ significantly, not least because of the variations in
performance metrics. Also many models are too simplistic,
same making unrealistic assumptions. Therefore the results of
the different performance analyses are not directly comparable.
In particular, one cannot derive reliable statements whether
the current MAC scheme is sufficiently robust and reliable for
safety applications or not.
In this paper we try to get closer to a statement, whether
ITS-G5A MAC is reliable enough for future CAM based safety
applications in high dense scenarios or is not. In doing so,
we simulated a high dense freeway scenario, used the update
delay metric and its representation from [8] and analyzed two
example safety applications according to their reliability.
III. SIMULATION SCENARIO
For our performance analysis we used ns-3, an open-source
event based simulation environment written in C++, which
provides a lot of useful features. The stable release at that
time was ns-3.6. In order to be able to simulate with the
current ETSI ITS-G5A communication technology, we had to
extend a standard 802.11 protocol towards the latest version of
the definition of ITS-G5A, i.e. we implemented many of the
specific communication protocols as they were not available
for ns-3 at that time.
In [8] we tried to identify important traffic scenarios and
classified them with respect to MAC challenging issues. In
particular the freeway has exposed to be the most challenging
scenario for MAC.
In this paper we have used a similar simulation configuration
as in [8]. We have modeled a straight 25 km long freeway seg-
ment with 6 lanes in each direction. The vehicles are generated
Erlang distributed with a Mean Time Ahead Distance (MTAD)
of 2 seconds for each lane. This models the mandatory 2
second time ahead distance between cars on high quality road
networks. The PHY/MAC implementation is based on ETSI
ITS-G5A, i.e. a channel width of 10 MHz, a default data rate of
6 Mbit/s and a maximum transmit power of 33 dBm. Because
we are mainly interested in MAC performance, we used a log-
distance pathloss model with an exponent of 2.25 to simulate
a simple radio propagation, neglecting most of the PHY layer
effects like shadowing, multipath propagation, doppler, etc.
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TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Simulation stop criterion If 109 messages have been processed
Length of freeway section 25 km
Length of freeway edge 10 km
Length of freeway core 5 km
No. of lanes per direction 6
Mean time ahead distance 2 s
Vehicle speed for each lane 20 m/s, 24 m/s, 28 m/s,
32 m/s, 36 m/s, 40 m/s
Transmit power 33 dBm
Channel bandwidth 10 MHz
Data rate 6 MBit/s
EDCA Priority Queue AC VO
Pathloss model Log-distance with
exponent 2.25
Communication range up to 1000 m
Error model SNIR based
Beaconing frequency 1 Hz, 2 Hz, 5 Hz, 8 Hz,
10 Hz, 12 Hz, 20 Hz
Message size 500 Byte
This results in the desired nominal communication range of
up to 1000 m. The error model used in ns-3 is Signal to Noise
and Interference Ratio (SNIR) based. More details on that
you can find in [32]. The CAM messages in our simulation
have a length of 500 Bytes (including security aspects like
signatures). They are sent periodically and their Beaconing
Frequencies (BFs), i.e. number of beacon transmissions per
second, are varied over several simulation runs. To eliminate
the edge effect2, the evaluation of the MAC communication
takes place within the simulated freeway core of 5 km length.
Further details on the simulation scenario can be found in [8].
All the assumptions above result in a high dense (data)
traffic scenario, i.e. about 170 vehicles on average within
the communication range and about 450 up to 8800 CAM
transmissions per second within the freeway core, depending
on the chosen BF. Table I summarizes the most important
simulation parameters.
Our basic performance metric is the so called update delay
[24], which is defined as the difference of reception times
between consecutive CAMs of the same transmitter. Typical
safety applications are based on the knowledge about the
vehicles in their surrounding. The received CAMs are used
to update the knowledge about the status of the transmitting
vehicle. The update delay has the interesting property that it
correlates with the up-to-dateness of the knowledge about the
status of the transmitting vehicle. To get the distribution of the
update delay it was measured for each receiver and a histogram
was built up. Then the histogram was processed to represent
the update delay as Complementary Cumulative Distribution
Function (CCDF), which shows the probability for exceeding
a maximum update delay value. This in turn can be used to
determine the reliability for not exceeding a maximum update
2The edge effect is a channel load irregularity at both ends of the freeway
caused by the freeway cut-off. This is because missing vehicles outside
the freeway section would normally influence the communication between
vehicles at the edge of the freeway section.
Fig. 1. Different update delay CCDFs by varying the beaconing frequency.
delay value. Typical CCDF plots are depicted in figure 1. As a
consequence, if the maximum allowed update delay boundary
for a CAM based safety application is known, the CCDF
shows the probability for exceeding this maximum allowed
value, which is equivalent to the probability of failure. The
latter can be interpreted as the unreliability of the safety
application itself. The reliability of that application can be
simply derived by 1 minus unreliability.
The procedure just described is our general approach for
the reliability analysis of CAM based safety applications [8].
This paper is focusing only on MAC communication issues of
ITS-G5A. That means, our simulation results in the following
section and consequently the reliability analysis of safety
applications in section V take only MAC communication
issues into account.
To get insight into the amount of data traffic on the channel
during one simulation run, we measured the mean channel
load. Because the channel load is a location dependent metric,
we didn’t determine the channel load for each vehicle. Instead
we placed fixed virtual measurement points on each lane and
at a distance of 100 m. These measurement points observe the
channel and calculates the percentage how long the channel
was sensed to be busy or messages have been received.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
To get reliable simulation results we took care in our
simulations in particular about the edge effect. Our analysis
revealed that it is necessary to simulate a 25 km freeway with
freeway edges of 10 km on each side, resulting in a freeway
core of 5 km. This simulation settings ensure that all vehicles
within the freeway core have the same channel load condition.
An example of our results from our simulations are repre-
sented in figure 1. It shows the update delay distributions for
different beaconing frequencies according to the simulation
scenario described in section III. The CCDF curves consider
all communication relationships within the whole communi-
cation range. In the diagram the update delay is shown on the
x-axis, the probability that the update delay is greater than a
certain x-value is assigned to the y-axis.
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Fig. 2. Different update delay CCDFs by varying the beaconing frequency.
An enlarged detail from figure 1.
Two important effects can be identified. The first one is
shown in figure 1: An increasing Beaconing Frequency (BF)
can improve the behavior of the update delay CCDF curve
in general. But this is only valid for BF values up to 8 Hz.
Continuing the increase of the BF, makes the CCDF curves
worse again. The reason for this behavior is the growing data
traffic on the channel by increasing the BF. Up to 8 Hz the
channel load increases, but as long as the channel load is
below a certain capacity threshold, this is not a severe problem
according to the number of collisions. But if the channel load
reaches the capacity threshold, the channel is saturated and a
further increase of the data traffic leads to a strong increment
of collisions and therefore also packet losses.
The second important effect can be seen in more detail
in figure 2. For small update delay values, the update delay
CCDF with the lowest BF is always the best one. But there
is a point in time, where CCDF curves with higher BFs
outperforms the CCDF curves with lower BFs. The reason
for this effect is the following: With respect to a certain time
interval, increasing the BF means increasing the number of
transmission attempts. Increasing the number of transmission
attempts means increasing the probability of a successful CAM
reception within the same time interval. This can be compared
with channel coding by code repetition, which also leads to
a higher decoding probability. For small update delay values,
the goodness of the update delay CCDFs is influenced mainly
by a few collisions due to a low channel load because of
transmitting with lower BFs. From the point in time, when
CCDFs with higher BFs outperform update delay curves with
lower BFs, the effect of increasing the number of transmission
attempts starts dominating the goodness of the update delay
CCDFs.
V. EVALUATION OF SAFETY APPLICATIONS
The update delay CCDF curves shown above are highly use-
ful for the evaluation of safety applications, which are based
on periodical beaconing. Taking the Basic Set of Applications
(BSA) document [5] provided by ETSI as an exemplary list
of possible safety applications, the update delay is a very
important metric to evaluate the reliability of applications such
as Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) [30], [29] or
the Lane Change Assistant (LCA). The general approach to
evaluate the reliability of a safety application based on CCDFs
is twofold:
• For a given maximum update delay bound (x-axis of
figure 1), the CCDF curves define the probability value
for exceeding this maximum update delay bound (y-axis
of figure 1).
• For a given minimum application reliability (1− probabil-
ity for exceeding a maximum update delay value; y-axis
of figure 1), the necessary supported maximum update
delay can be identified from the CCDF curves (x-axis of
figure 1).
For the following evaluations we consider the scenario that
all vehicles are sending with 8 Hz beaconing frequency.
A. Evaluation of application 1: Cooperative Adaptive Cruise
Control (CACC)
The CACC application (see section C.2.10 in [5]) allows
a vehicle to automatically follow a leading vehicle. This is
done by adapting the speed and direction in a way that it
keeps a certain Time Ahead Distance (TAD) to the leading
vehicle. This application has many parallels to the cooperative
forward collision warning, for this reason we rate CACC as
safety application.
To analyze the CACC application with respect to the re-
quired maximum update delay value, the following assump-
tions were made: According to the advisory speed limit on the
freeways in Germany, the maximum speed vmax is 130kmh for
the vehicles running CACC. The TAD between consecutive
cars is 2 seconds. Assuming further that the leading vehicle
is a very new one with tip-top anti-lock disk brakes and the
following car is an old one, with old attrited brakes, the leading
vehicle has a much shorter braking distance than the following
older one. To take care of this effect, a minimum braking
deceleration adecel,min of 6ms2 and a maximum deceleration
adecel,max of 9ms2 is assumed here [31], to avoid forward colli-
sions. Finally a maximum processing time of 100 milliseconds
is assumed, which considers all processing tasks above the
MAC layer, e.g. processing of CACC algorithm.
To find the update delay bound, the next step is to split up
the TAD into its shares:
TAD = UDmax(BF ) + tdecel + tCAM (BF ) + tproc (1)
UDmax is the interesting unknown and tdecel is the safety
time distance we must take care of because of possible dif-
ferent braking decelerations as mentioned above. tCAM arises
because of the periodic transmission of the CAM. Finally tproc
denotes the maximum processing time mentioned above.
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Fig. 3. Update delay CCDFs in the interval from 0 to 1 s by different
beaconing frequencies considering all communication relationships within a
100 m communication range (CR).
The tdecel can be calculated the following way:
tdecel =
dbrake(vmax, adecel,min)
vmax
−dbrake(vmax, adecel,max)
vmax
=
v2max
2×adecel,min −
v2max
2×adecel,max
vmax
(2)
Thereby dbrake(vmax, adecel,min) and
dbrake(vmax, adecel,max) denote the braking distances
with minimum and maximum deceleration respectively. Using
their given values from above, equation (2) results in 1 s for
tdecel.
Because CAMs are sent periodically, the worst case is, if
a CAM has just been received then a receiver has to wait at
least
tCAM (BF ) =
1
BF
(3)
to get the next status update.
The maximum update delay finally can be calculated by
using equation (1). Inserting the results of equation (2) and
(3) leads to
UDmax(8Hz) = TAD − tdecel − tCAM (8Hz)− tproc
= 0.789s
Figure 3 shows another set of update delay CCDFs by
using our default simulation configuration described in section
III. The different CCDF curves belongs to various beaconing
frequencies and considers all communication relationships
within a 100 m communication area.
Using figure 3, one can pick out the appropriate probability
for exceeding the UDmax(8Hz) value 0.789 seconds. The
resulting probability value for the 8 Hz CCDF curve and there-
fore the resulting unreliability value for the safety application
is in the range of 2 × 10−3. This means that every 500th
CAM update takes longer than the required maximum update
Fig. 4. Update delay CCDFs in the interval from 0 to 4 s by different
beaconing frequencies considering all communication relationships within a
100 m communication range (CR).
delay. This is absolutely not acceptable for a reliable safety
application.
Another evaluation approach for CACC is to assume a
postulated reliability for the safety application and calculate
the maximum allowed speed to run CACC with that reliability.
Assuming a CACC application reliability of 1 − 10−6 =
0.999999 means a probability of 10−6 for exceeding the
maximum allowed update delay. Using figure 4 one can pick
out the appropriate maximum update delay value of 2.25
seconds, considering the 8 Hz CCDF again. The first thing
you will notice about this result is, that CACC can not run
using a TAD of 2 seconds, because UDmax(8Hz) is already
greater than 2 seconds. Hence, for further considerations we
assume a TAD of 3 seconds. The remaining assumptions are
the same as before.
For the following calculations we start with equation (1)
again. The interesting unknown now is the variable vmax,
which is contained in tdecel. Solving equation (1) for tdecel,
we get:
tdecel = TAD − UDmax(8Hz)− tCAM (8Hz)− tproc
= 0.539s
Then equation (2) can be solved for vmax:
vmax =
2× tdecel(
1
adecel,min
− 1adecel,max
)
= 19.40
m
s
= 69.85
km
h
This means, driving with a maximum speed of 69.85 km/h
CACC will work with a reliability of 1 − 10−6, i.e. 99.9999
%. A maximum allowed speed of 69.85 km/h for cars on a
freeway is also not acceptable as well as a reliability of only
1− 2× 10−3, i.e. 99.8 % at tempo 130 km/h.
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Fig. 5. Example scenario for the lane change assistance: Dependent on the perspective, the respective vehicle should be aware of the other vehicle not later
than the fast approaching vehicle enters the critical distance.
B. Evaluation of application 2: Lane Change Assistance
(LCA)
The second example safety application presented in this
paper is the LCA (see section C.1.4.2 in [5]), which is
responsible for avoiding hazardous lane change maneuvers by
informing the lane changing vehicle as well as the vehicle on
the neighboring lane about each other. So two perspectives
can be identified for this application. The first perspective is
from the lane changing vehicles view, which is informed about
vehicles on the neighboring lane and possibly issues a warning.
The second perspective is from the fast approaching vehicles
view, driving on the neighboring lane, which is informed about
the lane changing vehicle and possibly issues a warning, so
that the driver can initiate full braking if necessary.
To analyze the LCA application according to the maximum
required update delay, certain assumptions are required again:
The minimum speed on Germany’s freeways is 60 km/h
and therefore also for our analysis. Furthermore a maximum
speed of 250 km/h is assumed, because of technical speed
restrictions of some German car manufacturers. Both speed
limits leads to a maximum relative speed vmax,rel of 190
km/h or 52, 78 m/s between the slow lane changing vehicle
and the fast approaching vehicle on the neighboring lane. For
the fast approaching vehicle this results in a braking distance
dbrake of nearly 350 m assuming bad conditions, i.e. a braking
deceleration of only 4ms2 . Because we don’t want both cars
driving nose to tail after the braking maneuver, we consider an
additional safety distance dsafety of 10 m. Adding both, the
braking and the safety distance, leads to the critical distance
dcritical, up to which both cars should be aware of each other
as depicted in figure 5. Assuming a communication range CR
of 1000 m, after subtracting the critical distance, 640 m are
left for CAM exchange to inform both vehicles about each
other according to the two perspectives mentioned above. To
get the maximum required update delay value the only thing
to do is dividing 640 m by vmax,rel, which results in about
12 seconds. This calculation applies for both perspectives, the
lane changing vehicles view as well as the fast approaching
vehicles view.
After the calculation of the maximum required update delay,
the reliability of the safety application can be determined, in
a scenario defined above by means of figure 2. Considering
the 8 Hz beaconing frequency scenario one can see that the
probability of exceeding an update delay of 12 s is 2× 10−6.
As a consequence the reliability of the safety application is
1− 2× 10−6, i.e. 99.9998 %. This reliability value might be
enough for safety applications, but the decision whether it is
or is not is the responsibility of the application engineers.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper makes two contributions to the performance
analysis of ITS-G5A MAC for safety applications in high
dense scenarios: First it provides a set of update delay CCDFs
which serves as a base for evaluations of safety applications.
Therefore a broad freeway scenario has been simulated and
the data traffic has been varied by varying the beaconing
frequency. As a result two important effects have been identi-
fied, caused by varying the beaconing frequency. Hence, under
some circumstances the update delay CCDF can be improved
by increasing the beaconing frequency as long as the channel
load is below a certain capacity threshold.
Second, two CAM based example safety applications have
been analyzed according to their performance and reliability
in a high dense freeway scenario. The results have shown that
there are safety applications which might work reliable enough
using ITS-G5A MAC, but there are also safety applications
which definitely do not.
As a consequence we think that current ITS-G5A MAC is a
good starting point, but more reliable communication protocols
are needed to run trusted safety applications in the future.
In future we want to simulate with more realistic channel
models to consider also some PHY layer effects like shad-
owing, multipath propagation and doppler. This will result
in more accurate CCDF plots with respect to the reliability
analysis of safety applications.
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